Appeals Court decision: Liz L. v. Ursel U., No. 25-P-281 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 15, 2026)
Two questions sit at the center of most litigated prenuptial agreements: what did the parties actually promise, and what law governs those promises?
The Massachusetts Appeals Court answered both this week in Liz L. v. Ursel U., vacating the alimony and property division portions of a 2024 divorce judgment, reminding litigants and lawyers alike how important it is to craft agreements that can stand the test of time and fully capture the intention of the parties.
The Agreement
The parties signed their agreement in October 2000, ten days before the wedding. The prenuptial agreement included language about what would be considered separate property and what would be considered property subject to division. There was a carve-out placing the husband’s “Trust Interests” and “Interests in [the company]” permanently beyond division. There was also a provision addressing alimony, which indicated that if the parties had children at the time the marriage ended, the wife “expressly does not waive” alimony and the parties “will in good faith negotiate (and, if appropriate, from time to time renegotiate) an amount of alimony to be paid,” allowing her to maintain a lifestyle similar to the one the family had enjoyed. These provisions of the agreement “survived”, meaning that they were not subject to modification by the Probate and Family Court. The Wife filed for divorce 19 years later.
Alimony
One of the central issues in this case turned on whether or not the provision relating to alimony was meant to provide for alimony indefinitely, which was how alimony was handled before the enactment of the Alimony Reform Act, or if it was subject to the provisions of the Act, which presumptively terminate alimony upon the payor reaching full Social Security Retirement age (67). The trial judge found the agreement “incomplete” as to alimony duration, applied the Alimony Reform Act’s retirement provision, G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f), and terminated alimony when the husband reaches full retirement age in 2031.
The Appeals Court disagreed with this interpretation, reasoning that at the time the agreement was signed, the law provided for indefinite alimony and the agreement itself did not provide that it would be subject to future changes in the law, but rather that it survived. The Court found that the law existing when an agreement is made becomes part of it; later enactments do not, “unless its provisions clearly establish that the parties intended to incorporate subsequent enactments.” Nothing in this agreement did.
The Husband also argued that the clause in the prenuptial agreement was just a reservation of rights to seek alimony in the future rather than an enforceable obligation. The Appeals Court disagreed, noting the use of mandatory language, which stated, The parties “will” negotiate an amount “to be paid”. The language also provided three distinct guidelines regarding a mechanism for the calculation of alimony, which were that it must allow the wife to maintain the marital lifestyle, that it must account for the wife’s other income including child support and investment returns, and must not push the husband’s lifestyle below hers. Those aren’t the hallmarks of a placeholder.
Property Division
The prenuptial agreement executed by the parties contained a limited definition of what could be considered separate property. The separate property was not subject to division, but any property not included in the definition was subject to “equitable division”. Specifically, Husband’s interest in “the company” and “trust Interests”. It also excluded income from the sale of these assets.
The husband acquired, during the marriage, roughly 359,000 company shares purchased with company loans, interests in company investor entities received as dividends on those shares, and company debentures purchased with cash. The trial judge excluded all of these assets from the divisible estate as “Interests in [the company].”
The Appeals Court disagreed, finding that these assets did not meet the narrow definition of separate property outlined in the parties’ agreement because the additional shares and dividends were not purchased using sale proceeds from separate property. The Husband argued that income from the company should also be considered separate property, but the Appeals Court found that interpretation “absurd” in that it would exclude earned income or joint assets into company interests and render marital property untouchable. The court noted that the outcome “could potentially render the agreement unenforceable,” citing DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18 (2002).
In this case, the income from separate property was not included in the definition of separate property. While this is something that can be included in an agreement and oftentimes is, it is of equal importance to consider the Appeals Court’s admonition that if it had been included, it may have made the entire agreement unenforceable. This is because the Court looks at the agreement at the time it is drafted and also at the time of the divorce to ensure that it is not “unconscionable” at the time of divorce.
Division of Legal Fees
A smaller but eminently practical holding. The parties had stipulated that fees the husband paid on either party’s behalf would be “credited against . . . each party’s share” of the estate. The judge deducted the wife’s fees from her 55 percent share of the remaining assets, without any corresponding deduction from the husband’s share and without adding the fees back to the pot first.
That was an error. The correct sequence: add all advance fees back into the divisible estate, divide under § 34, then deduct each party’s advance from that party’s resulting share. The husband’s argument that the stipulation never used the words “add back” got nowhere against the word “each.”
What this Case Means for your Prenuptial Agreement
- What Law to Apply: Your lawyer should help you consider whether or not you want to include changes in laws to your prenuptial agreement. This is a hard question because the future is unquantifiable. However, if the parties want future statutory changes to apply, the agreement must say that in your agreement. Silence on this issue defaults to the law on the signing date. If you are not sure what law you want to apply, then at the very least be clear with your intentions, so your divorce does not require six (6) plus years of litigation because of any potential ambiguity.
- Modal verbs are load-bearing. “Will negotiate an amount to be paid” reads as a promise. “May seek” reads as a reservation. The gap between those phrasings was worth, here, an alimony obligation running past 2031 on a base figure north of $4 million per year.
- If duration matters, state it. A court will not supply a termination date it thinks the parties chose not to include.
- Keep definitional sections and operative sections distinct. Defining a category is not the same as assigning it a legal status. If every asset meeting a definition is meant to be non-divisible regardless of how it was acquired, say that expressly.
If you are spending the time and money to draft a prenuptial agreement, you should work with a lawyer who can ensure that your agreement will hold up to the test of time and clearly indicates your intentions. You do not want to end up in the same situation the litigants in this case found themselves in, which was navigating multi-million-dollar disputes that to-date have lasted more than six years. The lawyers at Mansur Law Group can help you understand the legal nuances of these agreements and help you ensure that you understand your agreement and ensure that it follows your intentions. Call us today at (978) 341-5040, or contact us online here.
This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice.